We present a DSGE model where …rms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external …nance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the …nancial crisis of 2007-09, namely the observed shift from bank …nance to bond …nance despite the increasing cost of debt securities relative to bank loans. We show that substitutability among instruments of external …nance is important to shield the economy from the adverse e¤ects of a …nancial crisis on investment and output.
Introduction
During the …nancial crisis of 2007-09, European banks experienced major di¢ culties to …nance themselves in money markets. Starting in August 2007, concerns about their exposure to the US sub-prime market enhanced the perception of counterparty risk in the interbank market and triggered a drying-up of liquidity. Banks refrained from lending to each other and began to hoard liquidity. Their funding di¢ culties were soon passed on to the corporate sector.
Euro area non-…nancial corporations -traditionally heavily dependent on bank-…nance -faced progressively tightening lending standards.
Early in 2008, non-…nancial corporations started shifting the composition of their debt from bank loans towards debt securities (…gure 1). At the same time, the cost of market debt raised above the cost of bank loans, where it remained throughout the crisis (…gure 2). Despite the increase in the cost of external …nance, aggregate debt to equity kept rising and only stabilized in 2009, while the default rate of non-…nancial corporations increased sharply. The turmoil on …nancial markets implied an aggregate drop in investment and output that was unprecedented since the introduction of the euro.
In this paper, we propose a model that can account for the stylized facts observed during the crisis both on the composition of corporate debt and on aggregate economic activity. We use the model to evaluate the role played by the composition of corporate debt in determining the response of investment and output during the crisis. In particular, we investigate the endogenously evolving debt structure, and the possibilities for companies to switch between bank …nancing and bond …nancing, and argue that it is important to account for this margin of adjustment when analyzing the e¤ects of …nancial shocks on aggregate economic activity.
The framework we consider is a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model where lenders and borrowers face agency costs, and where heterogeneous …rms can choose among alternative instruments of external …nance. The model is a version of the model analyzed in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) . There, we focussed on the steady state analysis, while the emphasis here is on the analysis of the dynamics and on the propagation of speci…c shocks, possibly accounting for the …nancial crisis. To do so, we enrich the model, allowing for nominal contracts and using a quarterly calibration.
The model generates an endogenous corporate debt structure as a result of two key features. The …rst is the existence of two types of …nancial intermediaries, where banks (which intermediate loan …nance) are willing to spend resources to acquire information about an unobserved productivity factor, while "capital mutual funds" (which intermediate bond …nance) are not. Because information acquisition is costly, bond issuance is a cheaper -although riskier -instrument of external …nance.
We view banks as …nancial intermediaries that build a closer relationship with entrepreneurs than dispersed investors. They assess and monitor information about …rms' uncertain productive prospects and are ready to adapt the terms of the loans accordingly. Our modelling of banks builds on theories of …nancial intermediation that stress the higher ‡exibility provided by banks relative to the market (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) ). It is also consistent with the recent role taken by banks as originators of asset-backed securities, which requires screening of applicants'projects.
Entrepreneurs (or …rms) in our model choose between obtaining bond …nance, bank …nance or abstaining from production, based on information available at that time. When they choose bank …nance, a further, but costly investigation of the proposed production reveals additional information, and provides the entrepreneur with the option of not proceeding with the loan, if the expected gains then turn out to be lower than those from abstaining from production and saving the available net worth.
In equilibrium, …rms experiencing high risk of default choose to abstain from production and not to raise external …nance. This choice enables them to retain their net worth, which would otherwise get sized by …nancial intermediaries in case of bankruptcy. Firms with relatively low risk of default choose to issue debt securities because this is the cheapest form of external …nance. Firms with intermediate risk of default decide to approach banks, as they highly value the option of getting further information before deciding whether or not to produce. The model delivers a distribution of …rms among …nancing choices (whether or not to raise external …nance) and among debt instruments (bank loans or debt securities) that reacts to aggregate conditions and evolves endogenously over the cycle.
We investigate the dynamic shift of these boundaries in response to key three …nancial shocks: an increase in the "iceberg" cost of obtaining bank …nancing (or a deterioration in bank e¢ ciency), a decrease in capital quality similar to the capital quality shock in Gertler and Karadi (2011) , and an increase in uncertainty, as in, say, Bloom (2009) or in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) . We use these shocks to "build up" a quantitative interpretation of the 2007-09 …nancial crisis.
We obtain three sets of results.
First, we show that the model can qualitatively replicate the observed changes both in the composition of corporate debt and in aggregate variables, in response to a shock that increases information acquisition costs and reduces the e¢ ciency of banks as …nancial intermediaries.
This shock induces a fall in the ratio of bank loans to debt securities, as a larger share of …rms with high ex-ante risk of default now …nds the cost of external …nance too high, and choose to abstain from production. Similarly, a larger share of …rms experiencing intermediate realizations of the …rst productivity shock …nd the ‡exibility provided by banks too costly, and decides to issue bonds instead.
The shift in the composition of debt in turn a¤ects the cost of external …nance. Bond …nance becomes more costly as the average risk of default for the new pool of market-…nanced …rms is higher. The cost of bank …nance also rises because the share of …rms with low risk of default that move from bank-…nance to bond-…nance more than compensates the share of …rms with high risk of default that move out of banking and decides not to produce. Overall, the increase in bond yields is higher than the increase in lending rates. The higher cost of external …nance increases the average default rate. The shock further exerts contractionary e¤ects on real activity as a consequence of the reduction in the fraction of producing …rms. More …rms decide not to approach a …nancial intermediary and a larger share of bank-…nanced …rms decides not to produce, conditional on obtaining information on the uncertain productivity factor. The aggregate level of credit and investment fall, together with output.
Our second result relates to the ability of the model to match quantitatively the responses observed during the …nancial crisis. We show that the peak e¤ects (relative to post-EMU averages) can be broadly replicated when all three shocks are combined.
Our third …nding is that …rms'ability to shift among alternative instruments of external …nance has important implications for the e¤ects of shocks on aggregate activity. We compare the real e¤ects of a shock to bank costs when the corporate debt structure is endogenous to the e¤ects obtained when it is kept unchanged. Consistent with recent empirical evidence documented in Becker and Ivashina (2011), we …nd that the e¤ects on the cost of external …nance, investment and output are greatly ampli…ed when the debt structure is exogenous relative to the case when it reacts to aggregate conditions. Our paper relates to recent work by Adrian, Colla and Shin (2011). As we do, they document and explain the fall in bank …nance during the 2007-09 crisis, the compensating increase in bond …nance, and the rising price of both instruments. Di¤erent from us, in order to account for this evidence, they present a model that builds around a procyclical behaviour of leverage for commercial banks. In a recession, banks sharply contract lending through deleveraging. Risk-averse bond investors need to increase their credit supply to …ll the gap in demand. In order to induce this outcome, risk premiums need to rise. In their model, as in ours, a contraction in economic activity arises because of the rising premiums, rather than because of a contraction in total credit. Our paper is also related to an older literature that models the endogenous choice between bank …nance and market …nance. Holstrom and Tirole (1997) and Repullo and Suarez (1999) analyse this choice for …rms that are heterogeneous in the amount of available net worth. In those models, moral hazard arises because …rms can divert resources from the project to their private use. In Holstrom and Tirole (1997), moral hazard applies to both …rms and banks, while it applies only to …rms in Repullo and Suarez (1999). In both cases, it is assumed that monitoring is more intense under bank …nance. The papers …nd that, in equilibrium, …rms with large net worth choose to raise market …nance, …rms with intermediate levels of net worth prefer to raise bank …nance, and …rms with little net worth do not obtain credit. One implication of their model is that a contraction in net worth, as observed during the crisis, leads to a reduction of bond …nance, at odds with the evidence observed during the recent …nancial crisis. In our model, …rms …nancing choices depend on their risk of default. Hence, a fall in net worth needs not produce a reduction in the share of bond-…nanced …rms. A second main di¤erence relative to this literature is that we cast the analysis of corporate …nance into a fully general equilibrium model. This enables us to relate the equilibrium choice of the instrument of external …nance to the behaviour of real aggregate variables in the economy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Following a summary of the key facts of the 2007-09 …nancial crisis in the EMU in section 2, we describe the model in section 3. In section 4, we present the analysis and describe the equilibrium of the model. We refer to the appendix for a description of the methodology we use to log-linearize the equilibrium conditions. An additional and interesting challenge arises because of the need to aggregate across heterogeneous …rms and because of the presence of endogenously changing regions of integration. Section 5 provides our results. We …rst document the response of …nancial and real variables under a temporary shock to bank information acquisition costs. Then, we document the ability of the model to match the peak e¤ects observed during the crisis. Finally, we evaluate the importance of considering …rms'endogenous debt structure for assessing the investment and output e¤ects of shocks. In section 6, we conclude. In the appendix, we provide details of the aggregation across …rms; we de…ne the …nancial variables used in the numerical analysis; we collect the conditions that characterize a competitive equilibrium in the model; we characterize the stochastic steady state and describe the numerical procedure used to compute it; and we illustrate how to obtain the coe¢ cients of the log-linearized equilibrium conditions.
The key facts
We regard the following as key facts for the 2007-09 …nancial crisis for the European Monetary Union (EMU). We report the "peak e¤ects" observed during the crisis, which we de…ne as the 4. The default rate (for all grades) rose from 0.7 percent to 2.5 percent on an annual basis, or, 241 percent in relative terms.
5. The debt to equity ratio (ratio of loans, debt securities and pension fund reserves to …nancial assets of the non-…nancial corporations) rose by 15 percent.
6. The investment-to-gdp ratio fell by 3.6 percent.
7. GDP fell by 6.8 percent.
Our aim is to provide a model which qualitatively as well as quantitatively can match these facts or, at least, can come reasonably close. We will focus on three shocks in particular.
We investigate an increase in the "iceberg" cost (denoted by ) of obtaining bank …nancing, motivated by the observed 40 percent increase in the item "commissions and fees" of preprovisioning pro…ts of euro area banks. We also investigate a decrease in capital quality, similar to the capital quality shock in Gertler and Karadi (2011) . Finally, we investigate an increase in uncertainty, as in, say, Bloom (2009) 
The model
We extend the model presented in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011). There, we focussed on the steady state properties, and used our results to shed light on the di¤erences in the …nancial structure between the US and the EMU. Here, our focus is on the dynamic impact of key …nancial shocks to analyze the 2007-09 …nancial crisis. To do so, we need a somewhat richer structure.
Before describing the details, it is useful to provide an overview of the model. Time is discrete, counting to in…nity. There are entrepreneurs, regular households, capital market funds, banks and a central bank. Households enter the period, holding cash as well as securities, and owning capital. They receive payments on their securities and may receive a cash injection from the central bank. Then aggregate shocks are realized. Households deposit cash at banks, buy shares of capital mutual funds and keep some cash for transactions purposes. They rent capital to …rms as well as supply labor, earning a wage. After receiving wages and capital rental payments, they purchase consumption goods and investments, subject to a cash-inadvance constraint. The deposits and capital market fund securities pay o¤ at the end of the period: the household receives these payments at the beginning of the next period.
Entrepreneurs enter the period, holding capital. The (end-of-period) market value of the capital is their net worth. They can operate a production technology, employing capital and labor, but to do so, they need to have cash at hand to pay workers and capital rental rates up front. Entrepreneurs can borrow a …xed multiple of their net worth to do so. The productivity of entrepreneurs is heterogeneous, and only part of that information is public information ex ante. The …nal amount produced is observable to the entrepreneur, but not completely observable to lenders, unless they undertake costly veri…cation. The interest rate at which entrepreneurs can borrow will therefore be endogenously determined, taking into account repayment probabilities and veri…cation costs.
Capital market funds provide break-even costly state veri…cation lending contracts to entrepreneurs based on the ex-ante publicly available productivity information. Banks are assumed to have closer relationships with entrepreneurs. At an iceberg cost to net worth, they can obtain some additional information about the productivity. Based on that additional information, the banks o¤er break-even costly state veri…cation contracts covering the remaining uncertainty. Given the initial publicly available information, entrepreneurs choose whether to approach capital market funds or banks for a loan, or abstain. If they approach a bank, they can still abstain, after the banks have obtained the additional productivity information. If an entrepreneur obtained a loan, he proceeds to produce, learns the remaining uncertainty regarding his project, and then either repays the loan or defaults. In case of a default, there will be costly monitoring. The entrepreneur then splits end-of-period resources into consumption and capital held to the next period, as net worth.
Households
At the beginning of period t, aggregate shocks are realized and …nancial markets open. We use P t to denote the nominal price level in period t. Households receive the nominal payo¤s on assets acquired at time t 1 and the monetary transfer P t t distributed by the central bank, where t denotes the real value of the transfer. These payments plus their cash balancesM t 1 carried over from the previous period are their nominal wealth. The households choose to allocate their nominal wealth among four types of nominal assets, namely cash for transactions M t , nominal state-contingent bonds B t+1 paying a unit of currency in a particular state in period t + 1, one-period deposits at banks D B t and one-period deposits at capital mutual funds D C t . The deposits earn a nominal uncontingent return. In order for the households to be indi¤erent between these two deposits, the returns must be the same, a condition that we henceforth impose. Write D t = D B t + D C t for total deposits, and R d t for the gross return to be earned per unit of deposit between period t and t + 1. We can then write the budget constraint as
where nominal wealth at the beginning of period t is given by
Households own capital k t , which they rent to entrepreneurs at a real rental rate r t . They also supply labor h t ("hours worked") to entrepreneurs for a real wage w t . After receiving rental payments and wage payments in cash, the goods market open, where the household purchases consumption goods c t and new capital, using total available cash and the cash value of their existing capital, but not more. They thus face a cash-in-advance constraint, given by
The household's problem is to maximize utility, given by
subject to the constraints (1,2,3), where is the households'discount rate and u ( ) and v ( ) are felicity functions in consumption and hours worked.
Entrepreneurs, banks and capital market funds
There is a continuum i 2 [0; 1] of entrepreneurs. They enter the period with capital z it , which will earn a rental rate r t and depreciate at rate . Entrepreneurs can post this capital as collateral, and therefore have net worth n it given by the market value of z it ;
Each entrepreneur i operates a CRS technology described by
where K it and H it denote the capital and labor hired by the entrepreneur .
The shocks " 1;it ; " 2;it and " 3;it are random, strictly positive and mutually independent entrepreneur-speci…c disturbances with aggregate distribution functions denoted by 1 ; 2 and 3 ; respectively. While we need to assume this for " 2;it and " 3;it , and wish to assume this for " 1;it for simplicity, we can more generally allow serial correlation in " 1;it . In that case, the distribution 1 will depend on " 1;it 1 , with little in ‡uence on the subsequent analysis, but perhaps with more palatable implications concerning the time series behavior of individual entrepreneurs 1 .
The shocks are realized sequentially during the period, creating three stages of decision.
In the …rst stage, " 1;it is publicly observed and realized at the time when the aggregate shocks occur, before the entrepreneur takes …nancial and production decisions. Conditional on its realization, the entrepreneur chooses between three alternatives. He can borrow fund from a capital mutual fund (henceforth: CMF) and produce. He can approach a bank and possibly receive bank loans to produce. He can abstain from production.
If the entrepreneur borrows funds from a CMF, he will obtain total funds in …xed proportion to his net worth
and learns about " 2;it and " 3;it once production has taken place. In De Fiore and Uhlig (2011),
we discuss and defend in greater detail the assumption of a …xed proportion as well as ruling out actuarily fair gambles. If the entrepreneur approaches a bank, the bank will investigate the quality of the project of the entrepreneur further, revealing " 2;it as public information. This investigation is costly to the entrepreur: his net worth shrinks from n it tô
Given the additional information as well as the new net worth, the entrepreneur then decides whether to proceed with borrowing or with abstaining. If the entrepreneur borrows, he obtains total funds
x it = n it from the bank (or a competing bank, as they now all have access to the same information).
If the entrepreneur abstains either in the …rst or the second stage, the entrepeneur takes his (remaining) net worth to the end of the period, and splits it into a part to be consumed and into a part to be carried over as capital into the next period. 1 Under the assumption that "1;it is iid, …rms could experience high volatility in ex-ante productivity and could frequently move from one instrument of external …nance to the other. Assuming an AR1 process for "1;it generates persistance both in …rms'productivity and in the choice of the instrument of external …nance. This, however, has no implications for the equilibrium allocations in the aggregate.
If the entrepreneur has obtained a loan, he proceeds with production, using the total funds obtained in order pay the factors of production
Upon producing, the entrepreneur then learns about the remaining pieces of uncertainty, i.e.
about " 2;it and " 3;it , in case the loan came from a CMF, or " 3;it , in case the loan came from a bank. These outcomes are not observable to the lender, however, unless the lender monitors the entrepreneur, destroying a fraction of the output in the process of doing so.
We assume that lending contracts are optimal and rely on revelation. As Townsend (1979) has shown, as is now well known and as we discuss in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011), the solution is a costly state veri…cation contract, in which entrepreneurs promise to repay the loan
= with a prior-information dependent interest rate. They default if and only if they cannot repay the loan, in which case the lender monitors the project. If the entrepreneur did not default, he will repay the loan, and split the reminder between current consumption and capital to be held to the next period, as net worth.
Similar to Gertler and Karradi (2011), we assume that entrepreneurs face di¢ culties in transforming end-of-period resources into capital next period. If to-be-saved resources at the end are given by f it , then capital next period is given by
In this way, we can investigate aggregate disturbances to entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial net worth. We assume that the logarithm of { t follows an AR(1) process.
Entrepreneurs have linear preferences over consumption with rate of time preference e ;
and they die with probability . We assume e su¢ ciently high so that the return on internal funds is always higher than the preference discount,
It is thus optimal for entrepreneurs to postpone consumption until the time of death. When they die or default on the debt, entrepreneurs receive an arbitrarily small transfer from the government to restart productive activity.
Monetary policy and equilibrium
Monetary policy occurs through central banks'liquidity injections, carried out with nominal transfers P t t to households. The total amount of liquidity injections in the economy is
where M s t denotes money supply. We assume that the latter grows at the exogenous rate ; M s t = M s t 1 : An equilibrium is de…ned in the usual manner as sequences so that all markets clear and so that all entrepreneurs, households and …nancial intermediaries take the optimal decisions, given the prices they are facing.
Analysis
The analysis here builds on and extends the analysis in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011).
Households
De…ne real balances as m t M t =P t and the in ‡ation rate as t P t =P t 1 : The safe nominal
1 : A comparison with the equation for the interest rate on deposits shows that R t = R d t : Since we concentrate on equilibria with R t > 1, we obtain the usual …rst-order conditions of the household,
Entrepreneurs: production
We solve the decision problem of the entrepreneur "backwards", starting from the last stage:
production. If the entrepreneur obtained a loan and commences production, he maximizes expected pro…ts
subject to the …nancing constraint (7), where
:
is the expected part of the entrepreneur-idiosynchratic productivity piece by the time the loan is obtained. A straightforward calculation shows that
Expected output at the time of loan contracting is given by
where
can be understood as the aggregate entrepreneurial markup over input costs or as the aggregate …nance wedge, while actual output is given by
is the remaining uncertain part of entrepreneur-speci…c productivity.
Entrepreneurs: …nancial intermediaries and lending decisions
The optimal contract sets a threshold ! it corresponding to a …xed repayment of P t " ' be respectively the distribution and density function of ! it ; implied by our distributional assumptions for " 2;it and " 3;it as well as the lending decision of the entrepreneur. The residual uncertain factor ! = ! it of production in (13) needs to be split across the entrepreneur, the lender and the monitoring costs. Given the treshold ! = ! it , de…ne
as the expected share of …nal output acruing to the entrepreneur and
as the expected share of …nal output accruing to the lender, with ! (!) the share of …nal output lost due to monitoring. In De Fiore and Uhlig (2011), we provide the details for this contracting problem. Competition between banks results in the break-even condition
with ! it minimal among all solutions to this equations. We write this minimal solution as
to emphasize that the distribution of ! is either the distribution of " 3;it for bank …nance or of " 2;it " 3;it for capital mutual fund …nance. It is easy to see that ! it is increasing in R t and decreasing in " e it and q t . If the entrepreneur has approached a bank for a loan, he has learned the second-phase value " 2;it and needs to decide whether to proceed with a loan or abstaining, by comparing his expected share of output when proceeding with a loan to the opportunity cost of holding the remaining net worth to the end of the period. The former is given by F d (" 1;it ; " 2;it ; q t ; R t )n it ;
The entrepreneur will therefore proceed with the loan, if that second-phase value " 2;it exceeds a threshold " 2;it " d it = " d (" 1;it ; q t ; R t ); which satis…es
In stage I and in light of " 1;it as well as aggregate information, the entrepreneur chooses whether or not to obtain a loan, and if so, whether to obtain it from a bank or from a capital market fund. The expected payo¤ for an entrepreneur, who proceeds with bank …nance conditional on the realization of " 1;it ; is F b (" 1;it ; q t ; R t ; t )n it ; where
is the expected entrepreneurial payo¤ for each unit of net worth from either proceeding with a bank loan or abstaining, after learning " 2 . The expected payo¤ for an entrepreneur, who proceeds with CMF …nance conditional on the realization of " 1;it ; is F c (" 1;it ; q t ; R t )n it , where
Finally, the expected payo¤ for an entrepreneur, who abstains from production, is n it . Knowing " 1;it , each entrepreneur chooses his or her best option, leading to the overall payo¤ F (" 1;it ; q t ; R t ; t )n it , where F (" 1 ; q; R; ) maxf1; F b (" 1 ; q; R; ); F c (" 1 ; q; R)g:
We assume that (A1)
; for all " 1 . Under (A1), a threshold for " 1 , below which the entrepreneur decides not to raise external …nance, exists and is unique.
We denote it as " bt : It is implicitly de…ned by the condition
The unique cuto¤ point is a function of aggregate variables only, " bt = " b (q t ; R t ; t ); and hence is identical for all …rms. Under A1) and A2), a threshold for " 1;it above which entrepreneurs sign a contract with the CMF, also exists and is unique. We denote it as " ct : It is implicitly de…ned by the condition
and it is thus identical across …rms, " ct = " c (q t ; R t ; t ):
Conditional on q t ; R t and t ; entrepreneurs split into three sets that are intervals in terms of the …rst idiosyncratic productivity shock " 1;it . Denote the …rm's decision on whether to produce with a dummy variable it :
The functions s a ( ) ; s b ( ) ; s c ( ) and s bp ( ) measure respectively the shares of …rms that abstain from producing, approach a bank, raise CMF …nance, and produce conditional on having approached a bank,
s bp (q; R; ) = Z " c (q;R; )
Because the return on internal funds is always higher than the rate of time preference, entrepreneurs accumulate wealth and only consume before dying. It follows that in the aggregate, entrepreneurs consume each period a fraction of their accumulated wealth. Entrepreneurial consumption and accumulation of capital are then given by
where f (q t ; R t ; t ) n t are aggregate pro…ts of the entrepreneurial sector, and f (q t ; R t ; t ) is de…ned in appendix A. As in (8), { t is an aggregate shock to net worth accumulation. We assume assume that it follows an AR(1) process. It a¤ects the ability of entrepreneurs to transform period t pro…ts into period t + 1 capital, and can be thought of as a shock to the quality of the existing capital (as in Gertler and Karadi (2011)).
For comparison to the data, the following calculations are useful. The loan rate R j it ; de…ned as the nominal interest rate that is charged for the use of external …nance, is implicitly given by the condition
It follows that the risk premium on the external …nance of a …rm i; which has chosen to use instrument j; is given by
Aggregation and market clearing
Aggregate demand for funds, x t ; output y t , and output lost to agency costs y a t are given by:
where the functions s b ( ) ; s c ( ) and s bp ( ) are given by (27)-(29). The function y ( ) aggregates the realized productivity factors across all producing …rms. The terms t s b (q t ; R t ; t ) and m ( ) q t measure the loss of resources due respectively to bank information acquisition and to monitoring costs, per unit of net worth. All these functions are de…ned in Appendix A.
Aggregate factor demands are given by
Market clearing for money, assets, labor and capital requires that M s t = M t + D t ; B t = 0; K t = k t + z t and H t = l t ; respectively. Market clearing conditions for loans and output are, respectively,
In appendix B, we provide analytical expressions for the aggregate …nancial variables that we use in our numerical analysis, namely the ratio of bank …nance to bond …nance, # t ; the average risk premium for bank-…nanced …rms, rp b t ; and for CMF-…nanced …rms, rp c t ; the aggregate debt to equity ratio; t ; the default rate on corporate bonds, % c t ; the average default across …rms, % t , and the net expected return to entrepreneurial capital, r z t . We collect the equations that characterize a competitive equilibrium in appendix C. In appendix D, we characterize the steady state and describe the procedure we use to compute it. In appendix E, we show how to log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around a stochastic steady state. This latter is a steady state where …rms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks but aggregate shocks are set to their long-run values. A particular challenge arises from the heterogeneity of …rms, and the need to log-linearize with respect to the boundaries of integrals, that is, by the need to aggregate across …rms and by the presence of endogenously evolving regions of integration.
Results
We seek to investigate the ability of the model to qualitatively and quantitatively replicate the key facts observed during the crisis on corporate debt and macroeconomic activity. We then use the model to evaluate the importance of …rms' ability to shift among alternative instruments of external …nance for aggregate activity. The model is calibrated in line with the long-run evidence for the euro area documented in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011). The dynamics of the system is solved, using log-linearization and Uhlig (1999)'s toolkit.
Calibration
We assume the functional form u (c t ) v (h t ) = log (c t ) h t for some parameter . We calibrate the model quarterly in order to match in steady state the …nancial facts documented for the euro area in De Fiore and Uhlig (2011). Since the model here is quarterly, while the model there is annual, we use slightly di¤erent parameters. To that end, we brie ‡y review our procedure for calibration. We set = :99 and the in ‡ation rate to 0.5 percent per quarter, corresponding to the annual average over the period 1999-2007 in the euro area. The corresponding nominal risk-free rate is R = 1:015: The depreciation rate is set at = :02 and the discount factor at = :99; implying a rental rate for capital of 3 percent. We choose = :64 in the production function and a coe¢ cient in preferences so that labor equal :3 in steady state. We set = :15; a value commonly assumed in related literature.
The iid productivity shocks v = " 2 ; " 3 are lognormally distributed. log(v) is normally distributed with mean 2 v =2 and variance 2 v ; so that E (v) = 1. The shock " 1 is autocorrelated and such that log(" 1;it ) = " 1 log(" 1;it 1 ) + 1 " 1 log( it ); where log( it ) is normally distributed with mean 2 =2 and variance 2 . It follows that E ( it ) = 1 and E (" 1;it ) = 1:
We set the remaining six parameters, ; ; ; " 1 ; " 2 and " 3 to values that jointly minimize the squared log-deviation of the model-based predictions from their empirical counterparts for the following six …nancial facts : i) the ratio of aggregate bank loans to debt securities for non-…nancial corporations, #, is 5.48; ii) the ratio of aggregate debt to equity, , is .64; iii) the average risk premium on debt securities, rp c , is 143 bps; iv) the average risk premium on bank loans, rp b , is 119 bps; v) the average default rate on debt securities, % c , is 4.96 percent; vi) and the expected return to entrepreneurial capital, r z t , is 9.3 percent. 2 The parameter values selected from our calibration procedure are = :017; = :977; = 2:28; " 1 = :007; " 2 = :03;
The stochastic processes for t and { t are assumed to have a persistence parameter of 0.9. The standard deviations are calibrated as to replicate, respectively, the maximum deviation observed during the 2007-2009 crisis of the ratio of bank loans to debt securities and of investment from their average over the post-EMU period.
Steady state
In order to understand the response of the composition of corporate debt to a shock to bank fees, it is useful to consider how a permanent reduction in a¤ects …rms' …nancing choices and risk premia in the steady state of our economy.
In the model, an increase in bank fees induces a change in the expected pro…t function F b (" 1;it ; q t ; R t ; t ). The higher the ; the lower the advantage of approaching a bank and obtaining additional information on " 2;it ; before deciding whether or not to produce and raise external …nance. From equations (24) and (25), it follows that an increase in shifts the thresholds " bt and " ct ; thus modifying the share of …rms approaching banks and the share of …rms raising external …nance from CMFs. On the contrary, equation (20) shows that the level of does not a¤ect …rms' choice of proceeding with production, conditional on having approached a bank. The share of bank-…nanced …rms that decide to drop out after observing the shock " 2;it remains una¤ected. Figure 1 plots the e¤ect of a 40 percent permanent increase in on the share of …rms choosing to abstain, to approach a bank and wait, and to raise CMF …nance and produce.
The black solid line shows the density function ' (" 1 ). The red and purple dashed lines show respectively the threshold for bank-…nance, " bt , and the threshold for CMF …nance, " ct , when equals its benchmark value of .016. The green and pink dashed-dotted lines show the same thresholds when is increased to .023. At = :016, …rms experiencing a value of " 1 at the left of the red dashed line …nd it optimal to abstain from production and to retain their net worth n it : Their risk of default at the end of the period in case of production is too high. Firms experiencing a value of " 1 between " bt and " ct rather …nd it optimal to raise external …nance from banks. Their risk of default is su¢ ciently high that the "wait and see" option provided by banks compensate the extra-fee being charged. Only …rms at the right of " ct are su¢ ciently safe to choose CMF …nance.
Under the larger fee, = :023; the thresholds " bt and " ct shift inwards. Firms facing a realization of " 1 between the red dashed and the green dash-dotted lines now …nd the ‡exibility of banks too costly relative to the bene…t. At the prevailing price of bank …nance, their risk of default is su¢ ciently high to make it optimal for them to abstain from production. Similarly, the share of …rms that experience a shock between the purple dashed line and the pink dasheddotted line now …nd it optimal to shift from bank …nance to bond …nance. The higher induces them to face the higher risk of default associated with CMF …nance.
Because the average creditworthiness (as measured by the realization of the …rst shock, " 1;it ) of CMF-…nanced …rms falls, the average risk premium on bonds rises. The average risk premium on bank …nance increases but not as much. The reduction in average creditworthiness due to some …rms with high " 1;it moving to CMF-…nance just more than compensate the improved risk prospects due to …rms with low " 1;it moving out of banking. Overall, the increase in the average risk premium is larger for bonds than for loans.
The response to a decrease in bank e¢ ciency
In order to capture the evidence observed during the …nancial crisis, we need to account for the observed fall in bank loans relative to debt securities and the simultaneous rise in the cost of market …nance relative to bank …nance. We conjecture that the shift was induced by a negative shock to bank pro…tability as well as a decrease in the e¢ ciency with which banks evaluates projects, having perhaps lost some of their con…dence in standard procedures used up to that point. We explore this explanation through the lenses of our model.
We model this as a shock that increases bank information acquisition costs, t , thus reducing the e¢ ciency of banks as …nancial intermediaries. The shock can be seen as capturing the di¢ culties in raising liquidity faced by euro area banks in 2007-2009. 3 It is calibrated as to generate a fall on impact of the ratio of loans to bonds of 16 percent, in line with the peak e¤ect observed during the crisis. Figure 4 shows that the response of the economy is qualitatively consistent with the evidence. As the cost of information acquisition increases, …rms move away from bank …nance.
A larger share of …rms facing low realizations of " 1 …nd the cost of external …nance too high, and choose to abstain from production. A larger share of …rms experiencing high realizations of " 1 …nd the ‡exibility provided by banks too costly, and decides to issue bonds instead. The ratio of bank loans to corporate bonds falls.
As in the data, the cost of both bank …nance and bond …nance rise, and the latter increases to a greater extent than the former. The risk premium on bond …nance unambiguously increases because the pool of CMF-…nanced …rms now presents a higher average risk of default. The risk premium on loans also increases on impact (although to a lower extent than bond …nance) because the share of …rms with low risk of default that move from bank-…nance to CMF-…nance more than compensates the share of …rms with high risk of default that move out of banking and decides not to produce.
The shock increases the aggregate default rate and the debt to equity ratio, as observed during the crisis. More frequent bankruptcies result from the larger cost of external …nance, which increases due to higher banking fees and risk premia. The aggregate debt to equity ratio rises because the reduction in aggregate net worth, due to lower available net worth of bank-…nanced …rms, is larger that the reduction in aggregate debt due to the shrinking share of producing …rms.
The real e¤ects of the shock to bank costs arise as a consequence of the reduction in the fraction of producing …rms. As more …rms decide not to approach a …nancial intermediary (the share of abstain increases) and a larger share of bank-…nanced …rms decide to drop out after obtaining information on the second productivity shock, the aggregate level of credit and 
5.4
The response to a shock to capital quality. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to a reduction in capital quality, { t ; which is normalized to produce the observed peak fall in the ratio of aggregate investment to GDP of 3.6 percent.
Like the bank e¢ ciency shock to , this shock generates responses which are qualitatively in line with the evidence. The shock reduces entrepreneurs' capital and net worth in period t + 1. It also reduces output, but not as much because a large fraction of the capital stock is owned by households and it is una¤ected by the shock. Because leverage is constant for each producing …rm, an equilibrium requires inducing a larger share of …rms to borrow and produce. The share of producing …rms indeed raises because the diminished net worth increases the average …nancial distortion, as measured by the markup q; contributing to raise expected pro…ts from production. The higher pro…tability also explains why some of the …rms which would otherwise be borrowing from banks now shift to bond …nance. For those …rms, improved production prospects reduce default risk and the value of the "wait-and-see " option o¤ered by banks. The average risk premium rises both on bonds and on loans, re ‡ecting the inclusion of new …rms with high default risk in the share of both bank-…nanced …rms and CMF-…nanced …rms. As a consequence, the economy faces a higher average risk of default.
Relative to a shock to banking fees, a reduction in capital quality generates more sizeable e¤ects on real and aggregate …nancial variables. A shock normalized to replicate the peak e¤ect observed on investment generates an increase in the ratio of aggregate debt to equity of 27 percent (vs 15 percent in the data). The fall in GDP and the increase in the spreads and aggregate default rate are larger, but still far from the levels observed during the crisis. Also, the shift from bank …nance to bond …nance is too mild (0.8 percent).
A combination of t and { t better captures the magnitude of the responses observed during the crisis. The experiment is illustrated in …gure 6, where the shock to bank e¢ ciency is calibrated as to replicate the 16 percent drop in the ratio of bank loans to debt securities, while the shock to capital quality is set to generate an impact reduction in investment of 3.6
percent. The combined shock produces a sizeable increase in the debt to equity ratio and an output contraction that is closer to (although milder than) the data, relative to the case where t is the only shock. Nonetheless, it generates too little movements in the average risk premia and in the aggregate default rate.
The response to an increase in uncertainty
To provide a fuller account for the key facts, we shall appeal to three shocks. Aside from the shock to bank e¢ ciency and capital quality investigated above, we add a shock to the level of risk faced by …rms, i.e. a general increase in uncertainty. Speci…cally, we consider a shock which increases the standard deviation of " 3t . By a¤ecting the default risk faced by all producing …rms, this shock can produce large e¤ects on risk premia and default rates. For pragmatic reasons, we focus on a permanent change in that standard deviation, as it allows us to calculate the response as the transition between steady states. In a future version of the paper, we plan to add a temporary change in bank e¢ ciency and capital quality { to this.
Here, we show the e¤ects of a combined permanent shock to ; { and " 3 : The experiment is conducted by assuming that the economy starts from the calibrated steady state and converges to a new steady state where the three parameters ; { and " 3 take up their "post-crisis" level. Figure 7 shows the responses of the economy. The shock to " 3 is normalized to replicate the observed increase in the cost of bond issuance (70 percent). The response is computed in percentage deviations from the old steady state.
A combination of these three shocks replicates the responses observed during the crisis reasonably well from a quantitative point of view. The increase in " 3 produces large e¤ects on both risk premia and the aggregate default rate, which almost double, and a deeper contraction of output (by 2.7 percent), although still milder than observed. The main shortcoming is that the debt to equity ratio falls rather than to increase. The reason is that a higher " 3 reduces expected pro…ts and the share of …rms that decide to produce. As a consequence, total debt as a share of net worth is reduced. Also, the shock to " 3 exerts equally large e¤ects on the risk premium on loans and on the risk premium on bonds. They both increase by around 70 percent. In the data, they increase by 29 and 70 percent, respectively.
Exogenous thresholds
We evaluate the importance for the aggregate economy of …rms'ability to shift among alternative instruments of external …nance. We do so by comparing the impulse responses to a shock when thresholds " bt ; " ct and " d it are endogenous to the case when they are …xed at their steady state level. Figure 8 shows the results for the case of exogenous thresholds. The shares of …rms that abstain, approach a bank, raise bank-…nance and produce, and raise bond-…nance and produce, remain constant. Nonetheless, the ratio of total bank loans to corporate bonds fall, because the available net worth for bank-…nanced …rms is reduced, together with the amount of …nance these …rms can raise from banks. For the same reason, the overall debt to equity ratio falls.
The reduction in available net worth and total credit, together with the fall in the markup q t ; is also responsible for the fall in investment and output. Risk premia on loans and on bonds rise because the overall share of producing …rms is larger than what would be optimal at this higher level of bank fees. The average risk of producing …rms increases together with the risk premia.
Interestingly, the e¤ects of the shock on risk premia, investment and output are ampli…ed relative to the case when the thresholds are endogenous (reported in …gure 4). The risk premium on loans and the risk premium on bonds increase by 13 and 11 percent, relative to .06 and .5 percent, respectively, in the case of endogenous thresholds. Output and investment to GDP fall by 0.5 and 2.2 percent, relative to .02 and .05 percent when thresholds are endogenous.
The contractionary e¤ect of the shock is much larger when …rms are unable to substitute instruments of external …nance.
Our results are consistent with recent empirical evidence documented in Becker and Ivashina (2011) . Using …rm-level data on US …rms over the period 1990Q2:2010Q4, the authors show that the e¤ect of a reduction in loan supply on investment is positive and signi…cant for …rms that raise debt …nance and have access to both bond and loan markets. For …rms that are excluded from bond markets, the contractionary e¤ect is even larger.
Conclusions
We propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that enables to assess the macroeconomic consequences of …rms'…nancial choices and of the evolving composition of corporate debt.
In response to a shock that increases banking costs and reduces bank e¢ ciency in …nancial intermediation, the model replicates qualitatively the main facts observed during the crisis, namely the shift in corporate debt from bank …nance to bond …nance together with an increasing cost of debt securities relative to bank loans, and a contraction in investment and output.
The model points to an important role played by the composition of corporate debt in determining the response of real activity during the crisis. When …rms have no access to the bond market, the negative e¤ects on investment and output of a shock that reduces bank pro…tability are ampli…ed. These …ndings suggest that abstracting from an endogenous corporate debt structure -as generally done in models that assess the impact of …nancial market imperfections -may overstate the negative consequences of adverse shocks on real activity.
These results also suggest that the post-crisis policy debate in Europe needs to be broadened beyond banks and …nancial intermediaries, and needs to include considerations of shifts in …rm …nancing from banks to capital markets. Notwithstanding the central role of banks for ensuring …nancial stability, policy measures aimed at achieving easier substitutability of bank loans for other instruments of external …nance may be equally important, as they reduce the adverse consequences on economic activity of periods of …nancial distress. 
APPENDIX

A Aggregating across …rms
Aggregate pro…ts of the entrepreneurial sector are given by f (q t ; R t ; t )n t ; where
or, equivalently, by
Entrepreneurial consumption and accumulation of capital can then be written as equations (30) and (31) in the text.
De…ne
Z "c(qt;Rt; t)
" b (qt;Rt; t)
and m (q t ; R t ; t ) = (1 t ) mb (q t ; R t ; t ) + mc (q t ; R t ; t ) ; where mb (q t ; R t ; t ) = Z "c(qt;Rt; t)
and 2 3 is the distribution function for the product ! c = " 2 " 3 . Then, total output, y t ; and total output lost to monitoring costs, y a t , are given by equations (35) to (36) in the text.
B Financial variables
We provide analytical expressions for …nancial variables used in the numerical analysis.
The ratio of bank …nance to bond …nance, # t ; is de…ned as the ratio of the funds raised by bank-…nanced …rms to the funds raised by CMF-…nanced …rms, and is given by
Recall that the risk premium for a …rm i; which has chosen to use instrument j; is given by (33). Let rb (q t ; R t ; t ) and rc (q t ; R t ; t ) be rb (q t ; R t ; t ) = Z "c(qt;Rt; t)
The average risk premia for bank-…nanced …rms, rp b t ; and for CMF-…nanced …rms, rp c t ; are then given by
Although the debt to equity ratio (leverage) is …xed at the …rm level and given by 1 ; the aggregate debt to equity ratio for the corporate sector; t ; is endogenous and depends on the share of …rms that decide to produce. It is de…ned as the ratio of all debt instruments used by producing …rms to the aggregate net worth of all …rms,
The default rate on bonds, % c t ; is given by the share of …rms which borrow from CMFs but cannot repay the debt,
The average default amounts to the share of …rms which sign a contract with either a bank or a CMF but cannot repay the debt,
Finally, we de…ne the net expected return to entrepreneurial capital as
C Competitive equilibrium
For the convenience of further analysis, we collect the relevant equations here.
(a) Households:
(b) Entrepreneurs:
(c) Monetary authority:
(d) Market clearing:
(e) Production and aggregation:
2. First-order conditions.
(a) Household:
e t = f (q t ; R t ; t ) n t (66)
where we assume the shocks ( t ; { t ) to be drawn at t and i.i.d. across time.
Given the exogenous variables t and { t , equations (49) to (76) need to be solved for the variables characterizing the households choices, (m t ; d t ; c t ; k t ; h t ), the entrepreneurs choices (e t ; z t ; n t ; " b t ; " c t ; " d t ), the choices of the monetary authority ( t ; m s t ), aggregate quantities (y t ; y a t ; x t ); …nancial variables (# t ; rp b t ; rp c t ; t ; % c t ; % t ); and prices and returns ( t ; R t ; r t ; q t ; w t ). This is a system of 28 equations in 27 unknowns. Indeed, one equation is super ‡uous. By Walras'law, ful…llment of the budget constraints of the entrepreneurs and market clearing on all markets implies ful…llment of the budget constraints of the households as well.
D The stochastic steady state
We compute a steady state where we shut down the aggregate shocks, i.e. t = and { t = {; for all t. We denote steady state variables by dropping the time subscript.
We …nd it convenient to specify one of the endogenous variables, q, as exogenous and to treat as endogenous.Under the assumed speci…cation of the utility function, the unique steady state can be obtained as follows. For each value of q; we can compute ; r; w;and c by solving the equations
To compute the overall expected pro…ts F (" 1 ; q; R; ); given by the steady state version of (23), we use the following procedure. First, under our distributional assumptions about the productivity shocks " 1 ; " 2 and " 3 , we know that
where ' and denote the standard normal, x j = log ! j + 2 j 2 j and j = b; c: Second, we solve numerically the condition " j qg j (! j ) = R ( 1) to obtain the function ! j (" j ; q; R). The function ! b (" 1 " 2 ; q; R) for bank-…nanced …rms is derived by using the variance 2 " 3 of the lognormal distribution. The function ! c (" 1 ; q; R) for CMF-…nanced …rms is derived by using the variance 2 " 2 + 2 " 3 . The cuto¤ value " d for proceeding with the bank loan is found by solving numerically the condition F d (" 1; " d ; q; R; ) = 1: Using " d ; it is then possible to compute the expected utility per unit of net worth for the bank-…nanced entrepreneur, F b (" 1 ; q; R; ). The expected utility per unit of net worth for the CMF-…nanced entrepreneur can be computed as F c (" 1 ; q; R) = " 1 qf (! c (" 1 ; q; R)) : With this, it is possible to calculate the overall return F (" 1 ; q; R; ) to entrepreneurial investment, the thresholds " b and " c ; and the ratios 
Notice that in steady state,
and
Now write the budget constraint of the household as
Using the solution obtained, calculate z as z = c= c z and then compute the aggregate variables n; x; K; l and k: Then, use z = f (q; R; ) n to compute ; the steady state version of equations (35) and (30) to compute y and e; and of the resource constraint (40) to compute y a :
Finally, we use these results to compute the …nancial variables, given by (42)-(47), and the net expected return to entrepreneurial capital, given by (48), in steady state.
E Log-linearization
The equilibrium can be obtained by solving the system of equilibrium conditions, log-linearized around a stochastic steady state where = 1 and the aggregate shocks are set to their steady state values. The log-linearized equations are standard and are therefore omitted here.
The di¢ culty arises in the computation of the coe¢ cients multiplying the variables in the log-linearized equations. We illustrate here how they can be obtained. A detailed appendix with all the log-linearized equations and relative coe¢ cients is available from the authors upon request.
Consider the log-linearized condition corresponding to equation (35),
De…ne (" 1 ; q; R) " 1 ' 1 (" 1 ) R To compute the value of y (q; R; ) and y (q; R; ), we now need to compute the derivatives of the thresholds " b ; " c ; " d :
Consider …rst the threshold at stage II, " d (" 1 ; q; R) ; which is implicitely de…ned by Using the implicit function theorem, we have that 
Using equation (17), we obtain It follows that 
